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The Real Failure Rate of Restaurants 
by 
Chris Muller 
and 
Robert H. Woods 
A common assumption in the restaurant industry is that restaurants fail at 
an exceedingly high rate. However, statistical research to supporf this 
assumption is limited. The authors present a study of 10 years in the life 
of three markets and offer new data for managers to consider. 
"Restaurant Fails!" To many these two words would invoke nei- 
ther interest nor suspicion. Restaurants have often been expected to 
fail because the industry is known to have one of the highest failure 
rates in the U.S. economy. 
But over an extended period of time restaurants may not fail at 
such an astronomical rate. Indeed, according to Restaurant Business 
magazine and the Wall Street Journal, 1990 will see industry shrinkage 
for the first time in over a decade; growth through the 1980s was the 
best ever.' When one considers the growth rate of the restaurant 
industry in this country, it simply does not make sense to believe that 
the failure rate is nearly as high as popularly assumed. For example, 
in 1989 the National Restaurant Association estimated that there were 
528 people for every commercial food service outlet in the United 
 state^.^ When compared to the population per food service outlet of 
10 years earlier, according to the NRA, in 1979 there were as many 
800 Americans per food service outlet, 272 fewer persons per food 
service outlet in 1989 than in 1979. Therefore, over the last decade the 
number of food service outlets in the United States per person has 
increased by about 60 percent. Interestingly, over this same period the 
total population of the country increased by only about 5 percent. Such 
statistics would suggest that restaurants, in general, are flourishing. 
Regardless of the apparent growth in total number of restaurants 
in the United States between 1979- 1989, according to conventional 
wisdom, somewhere between 50 to 80 percent of all new restaurants 
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which open this year will fail within the first 12 months of opening 
their doors. This same conventional wisdom also suggests that about 
50 percent of the remaining restaurants will fail in their second year of 
operation and another 33 percent in their third year. 
This means that if 100 new restaurants were to open this year, 50 
to 80 would fail before their first anniversary. That would leave 30 
restaurants open in year two. Half of these 30 would subsequently fail 
in this second year, and a final third of those remaining would fail in 
their third year. As a result, if this conventional wisdom were true, 
after just three years, only 10 of the original 100 restaurants would 
remain open. As a result, there is about a 90 percent compound failure 
rate over the first three years of a restaurant's lifespan. However, if 
this were true the industry would have to have opened nearly 10 times 
as many restaurant units as it closed during the past decade. This phe- 
nomenal, and unlikely, 600 percent "new unit" growth simply did not 
occur. 
Current Impact of High Failure Perception is Significant 
Unproven, but widely believed statistics such as the 90 percent 
failure rate are significant. Such statistics undoubtedly affect how sev- 
eral different stakeholder groups perceive the restaurant industry. 
Bankers, for example, are an important stakeholder group interested in 
such figures because statistics such as these represent an important 
assumption in their screening decision when it comes to loaning 
money to new restaurants. Indeed, anyone who has even once asked a 
banker for a restaurant loan can likely attest to how broadly this group 
is influenced by the perceived high failure rates within the industry. 
As many restaurateurs will acknowledge, it is always difficult, 
and often impossible to interest bankers in making loans to 
entrepreneurs who operate in an industry with such high perceived 
risks. Even when loans for restaurants are available, restaurateurs 
often must pay higher interest rates or provide more extensive collater- 
al requirements to secure these "high risk" loans than might be 
required for other "less risky" ventures. This increased perceived risk 
is, of course, a direct result of the conventional wisdom which says 
restaurant failure rates are very high. 
Negative statistics such as those promulgated by the current con- 
ventional wisdom can also be significant for potential restaurant indus- 
try managers and employees. Surely this group of stakeholders must 
at some point assess whether or not they are interested in working for a 
firm that is at high risk of failure. For that matter, potential employees 
must wonder whether it is wise to consider a career in an industry in 
which failure is believed to be more common than success. Indeed, 
even hospitality management students (as future employees planning 
careers in the restaurant industry and as potential owners and operators 
themselves) must, of course, also be keenly interested in such 
unhealthy performance statistics. 
Since the perceived high failure rate for restaurants is important 
to many interested groups, it is also important to identify the source of 
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such statistics. Even though it is generally accepted that such high 
failure rates exist for restaurants, there is no research to support such 
claims. There appears to be little commonality between fact and fic- 
tion in this area. 
To determine the real failure rate of restaurants, a method popu- 
larized by Hannan and Freeman in their "population ecology" studies 
of organizations in 1974 and 1985 and widely accepted in organiza- 
tional behavior was used. 
Research Shows Failure Rate is Lower 
Restaurants depend primarily on their local consumer markets 
and secondarily on a transient or travelling market for their business. 
A primary means of communication to both of these market segments 
is by telephone. Hannan and Freeman assumed that all restaurants 
have telephones and, additionally, that in order to reach their two prin- 
cipal markets most restaurants advertise in the local Yellow Pages 
telephone directory. 
When Hannan and Freeman applied this approach to the study of 
the birth and death rates of restaurants in 18 cities in California, they 
found that only 14 percent closed during the three-year period in 
which the sample was observed, and an additional 12 percent changed 
ownership but remained open. Therefore, it is assumed that a change 
in ownership is indicative of failure (which, of course, may not always 
be true because some restaurants change hands for other reasons, i.e., 
relocation of original operation, death of owner, etc.). Over the three 
years of the extensive Hannan and Freeman study, a total of only 26 
percent of the restaurants observed experienced some form of fai1u1-e.3 
Hannan and Freeman selected a random sample of restaurants to 
observe for their study. While this approach is, of course, acceptable, 
rather than duplicating this method and creating a random sample of 
restaurants selected from the Yellow Pages, the sample markets in this 
study included the entire restaurant population for each of the markets 
studied. As a result, rather than observing the birth and death rates of 
some restaurants in the chosen market, these phenomena were charted 
for all of the restaurants in the markets. This approach is, of course, 
very time consuming as the following brief description of the methods 
outlines. 
The Hannan and Freeman method is a longitudinal approach to 
observing movements in the market. Therefore, to effectively utilize 
this method a benchmark must first be established. This was done by 
first culling a list of all restaurants in the Yellow Pages in each of the 
three markets studied. The relevant telephone books for each succes- 
sive year were used to duplicate this first step, i.e., to identify and list 
each restaurant advertised in the Yellow Pages. 
Firms which were continuously listed were assumed to be still in 
operation, while those which were no longer listed were assumed to 
have been closed. Since telephone directories customarily require 
payment for each directory listing in advance of going to press, this is 
a fairly reliable judge of recent (less than one year) business viability. 
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New restaurants were added each year and others were identified as 
being in continual operation; those enterprises no longer listed were 
considered to have been closed by their ownership. Therefore, by 
observing restaurant markets over a period of time, it was possible to 
chart both the lifespan of restaurants in each market as well as their 
openings and closings. The observation period in each of the three 
markets was 10 years; then the total observations were combined. 
Environmental Conditions Are an Influence 
Results for the three observed markets were combined to reveal 
an average overall failure rate of just 27 percent during the first year, 
less than 50 percent by the end of year three, and about 60 percent at 
the end of five years of operation. Indeed, the failure rate over the 
entire 10 years amounted to less than 70 percent. These failure rates 
are, of course, considerably lower than those which the prevailing con- 
ventional wisdom anticipates. In addition to the discovery that restau- 
rant failure rates are much lower than those suggested by conventional 
wisdom, some additional trends were evident. These trends are dis- 
cussed in the following chapter. 
In each individual market, and therefore in the combined markets, 
restaurant failure rates went up during times immediately following an 
economic disruption, such as the recession of the early 1980s, or fol- 
lowing a major localized economic event, such as the opening or clos- 
ing of a factory or other large employer. This finding may appear at 
first glance to appear normal. However, the implications are, in fact, 
far from "normal." Indeed, from this information it can be assumed 
that individual firm failure, while generally attributed to operator mis- 
management, may rely more on environmental conditions than on 
individual management practices. In fact, the statistics collected tenta- 
tively suggest that restaurant closings are hastened more by external 
factors within the environment than the prevailing view implies. If 
proven true by further research, this observation would tend to contra- 
dict the notion that good management can always overcome negative 
environmental conditions. 
Implications Exist for Managers and Owners 
While this research is only preliminary, some observations and 
implications are suggested for restaurant managers and owners. 
These implications appear to have special significance for operators 
anticipating decisions about unit expansion and entrylexit decisions, as 
well as those planning strategic marketing strategies. 
Economic stability likely means "1 birth=l death": 
During periods of relative economic stability, there is also a "general" 
stability in the total restaurant population in most local markets. This 
means that over the short to middle run (9 to 24 months) when a new 
restaurant opens, one or more existing restaurants will be forced to 
close within a relatively short period of time. 
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Strategic marketing should target weak players: In 
stable markets with no significant external environmental conditions, 
new entrants should aggressively target weaker players in the market 
with campaigns designed to take away existing market share from 
those players within the first year of operation. In this way new 
restaurant market entrants can "choose their victims" from the existing 
competition by assuming that the first contention of 1 birth=l death 
will likely prevail. Companies that do this will, of course, be able to 
compete on a more individualized or localized scale rather than 
attempting to compete with the entire market population. 
Identify market niches: Prior to site selection and opening, 
new entrants should identify vulnerable market niches where there is a 
strong potential for niche domination within 24 months. In this way 
restaurants may be able to somewhat insulate themselves from the 1 
birth=l death phenomena effects of new market entrants in the future. 
(This implication is based on the finding that birth and death rates are 
different in different market segments.) 
Plan for longer market establishment periods: In the 
past, conventional wisdom has suggested that restaurants need suffi- 
cient cash to sustain the first three months of operating budget. 
Preliminary results of this study suggest that, in fact, the first three 
years are crucial to long-term viability. Therefore, the implication for 
managers is that cash flow budgeting should be extended for at least 
this long in order to ensure success. 
Purchase restaurants that are three years old: A con- 
clusion that can be drawn from observing this three-year success pat- 
tern is that when looking to purchase an existing restaurant, operators 
should seek those firms that are just concluding their third year of 
operation-since these restaurants have already apparently weathered 
the real "shakeout years." Therefore, contrary to popular opinion, cur- 
rent operator profitability at this point may in fact be less important 
than the implied capture of sufficient market share to retain niche 
strength. 
Study the external environment carefully: Finally, it is 
of paramount importance that individual restaurant operators maintain 
a constant understanding of the external economic variables that have 
an effect on overall restaurant demand. Much of the conventional wis- 
dom in restaurant management circles emphasizes cost containment 
and concentration on other internal variables. The initial results of this 
study suggest that extreme factors, such as variations in both the prime 
and local lending rates, cost-of-living index, factory lay-offs or hiring, 
and general unemployment levels, may be at least as important to 
eventual success as concentration on internal performance variables. 
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A case in point to illustrate this implication is that it appears like- 
ly from preliminary research that as local economies take a downturn 
and workers are displaced, a flurry of new restaurant openings occurs 
within the following two years. These marginal players, most likely 
lured by the apparently low barriers to entry into the restaurant busi- 
ness, will likely dilute the overall local demand for restaurants, and 
may speed both the decline of otherwise viable operations or weaker 
operators. The observant operator will sense these external factors and 
take the steps necessary to ensure a continued dominant market pres- 
ence. 
This research must still be considered preliminary4, but research 
is being expanded into other cities, other researchers (whether educa- 
tors or operators) should conduct similar studies on their own local 
markets because the broader the reach of such studies, the more under- 
standing there will be of the real causes of restaurant f a i l ~ r e . ~  
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